Preamble : the idea of power by unknown
PREAMBLE
THE IDEA OF POWER
Michel Henri Kowalewicz
Jagiellonian University in Krakow
michel.kowalewicz@uj.edu.pl
Orbis Idearum (ISSN: 2353–3900), Vol. , Issue 1 (2015), pp. 9–32
The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent; and therefore,
not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in
them, but of a few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can
understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attained it.
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*
Scientia, Potentia est; sed parva; quia Scientia egregia rara est, nec
proinde apparens nisi paucissimis, & in paucis rebus. Scientiae enim
ea natura est ut esse intelligi non possit, nisi ab illis qui sunt Scientia
praediti.
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury** 
Under this simple Idea of Power. I have taken occasion to explain
our Ideas of Will, Volition, Liberty, and Necessity; which having a
greater mixture in them, than belongs barely to simple Modes, might
perhaps, be better placed amongst the more complex.
John Locke***
Tout pouvoir est une magie réelle, si l’on appelle magie la possibilité
de produire des effets sans contact ni agent, en provoquant pour ainsi
dire une parfaite et immédiate docilité des choses. […] La magie,
c’est l’idée qu’on peut commander aux choses comme aux êtres.
Roger Caillois****
Probably the majority of our “modern” children intuitively associate the Power
icon (⏻) with the possibility of either activation or deactivation of all kinds of de-
vices: starting with a television or a light switch and ending with more complicated
and perhaps more fascinating items, such as smart phones, tablets, computers or
game consoles. 
Even a very young child is able to understand the two conditions, identified by
words like “on” and “off,” or by symbols such as “1” and “0.” These settings are
defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission (known in French as
La Commission électrotechnique internationale) and also include the widely used
symbols: IEC 5007 (line:⏽), IEC 5008 (heavy circle: ⭘), IEC 5009 (line within a
broken circle:⏻), and IEC 5010 (line within a circle: ⏼). The IEC 5007 symbol
means “on,” while IEC 5008 is associated with “off,” both symbols being taken
from the binary system. The symbol IEC 5009 (also associated with the black
waning crescent moon: ⏾), commonly referred to as sleep mode, is a low power
state, and the IEC 5010 symbolizes the radical control switch between the “on”
and “off ” states. The graphical symbols adopted by the International Electrotech-
nical Commission that represent these power states – “on,” “off,” and “sleep” – do
not need complex descriptions or detailed manuals to distinguish  “power up”
(that means “turn on” or “wake up”) from “power down” (that means “turn off ”
or “go to sleep”). We can imagine how this idea of equipment functioning captures
contemporary children’s perception of the world.
From this perspective a basic understanding of the concept of power comes
down to the ability to turn on or off a device. Sneaky parents can restrict access to
their children’s computer through parental controls software or by simply blocking
physical access to the device. The simplest solution in this case is to hide the power
supply. So, the power supply and power button are the basic instruments to control
the world of “modern” devices. 
As children quickly learn to control other children and to place their fate in the
exercise of power, they also acquire knowledge on different contexts and uses of
the word. With age they begin to understand the broader idea of power, that is,
the idea of power as extended beyond the simple control of things and people to
the abstract understanding of political control, ability or opportunity, and author-
ity or influence. At school, the child also discovers the mysterious secrets of power
from the standpoint of mathematics, electricity or of micro- or telescopic obser-
vations. The word “power,” use in singular or plural, accompanies us all in our
everyday lives, defining our place in the world and determining our relationships
not so much by pure force, but by setting the reach, and thereby the limits, of our
possibilities. From Antiquity to Modern Times, the historical dynamics of our
changing understanding of the idea of power recalls a child’s discovering of the
world, as both are based on new dealings and correlations.
The word “power,” which already in the middle of the 9th century was drawn
directly from the Latin posse (e.g. in French), expressed the modality of the
possible,1 reflects, in first place, the notion of probability. In the French language
one can notice the dynamics of the words pouvoir, savoir and vouloir that fulfill
dual roles depending on the context: both as verbs and as nouns.2 In English the
noun appears in the 14th century, adopted from the Anglo-French, but the verb is
a more recent innovation and going back to the end of 19th century and means
“to make powerful,” to supply a machine, or to move quickly.3 But the roots of
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the idea of “power” go also back to the Indo-European (potis) and Greek (posis
[πόσις], despotes [δεσπότης], and potnia [πότνια]) traditions, which Barbara Cassin
sketches in her Dictionary of Untranslatables (2004 for French, and 2014 for Eng-
lish edition).4 It was in the times of Quintilian that the Latin adjectives such as
possibilis and impossibilis first appeared. These adjectives were derived from the
verb potest, reflecting the Greek opposition: dunatos [δυνατός] and adunatos
[ἀδύνατος], and developed in turn from dunamis [δύναµις] meaning strength.5
The history of the idea of power is accompanied, therefore, by an understanding
of the notion as a logical category of modality, and as an ontological category (po-
tentia) that determines the real and the actual. Beside that, the idea of power is
most commonly associated with the ability to act in a moral or political sense of
potestas and has subsequently gained in importance particularly in Modern Times.6
In 1957 Robert A. Dahl attempted to deal not so much with the history of the
notion of power, but with the very concept that “is as ancient and ubiquitous as
any that social theory can boast.”7 He added simultaneously: “If these assertions
needed any documentation, one could set up an endless parade of great names
from Plato and Aristotle through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto and Weber
to demonstrate that a large number of seminal social theorists have devoted a good
deal of attention to power and the phenomena associated with it.”8
In 1597 Francis Bacon announced to all and sundry that Ipsa scientia potestas
est! 9 Thomas Hobbes considered scientia in 1651 to be a “small Power” and in
1668 he considered it to be a potentia. However, as recently was proved by Joseph
Canning in his stage on Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296-1417,10 al-
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See: R. A. Dahl: The Concept of Power. In: The Behavioural Science 2–3 (July 1957), p. 201.
See: ibid.
See: F. Bacon: Meditationes Sacrae. De Heraesibus: 1597, p. 241:“Dei quam potestatis; vel putiusejus
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to his power (for knowledge itself is power) whereby he knows, than to that whereby he works and
acts.’ (tr. Spedding; VII, 252). […] The rather specific context again makes it impossible to extract
the expression ‘knowledge is power’ as some Baconian axiom.”
See: J. Canning: Ideas of Power in the Late Middle Ages, 1296–1417, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-








ready in the late Middle Ages, Dante Alighieri, Marsilius of Padua, William of
Ockham, Bartolus, Baldus, and John Wyclif, drawing extensively on the tradition
of Aristotle and Augustine, were laying the foundations of the modern under-
standing of the notion of power. It is here that we also find emerging political dis-
course around the different facets of the concept. But Dahl observes in his
approach to the concept that:
Doubtless it would be easy to show, too, how the word and its synonyms are
everywhere embedded in the language of civilized peoples, often in subtly dif-
ferent ways: power, influence, control, pouvoir, puissance, Macht, Herrschaft,
Gewalt, imperium, potestas, auctoritas, potentia, etc.11
Referring specifically to the concept of power in English, Dahl is necessarily led
to conclude that: 
Unfortunately, in the English language power is an awkward word, for unlike
‘influence’ and ‘control’ it has no convenient verb form, nor can the subject
and object of the relation be supplied with noun forms without resort to bar-
baric neologisms.12
The concept of power that will be analyzed by Dahl, however, is understood as a
relationship among people within some specific properties of this relationship.13
According to Dahl, the key issue concerning power, however, is the possibility of
measuring power, i.e. the comparability of power.14 Only in this way is it possible
to estimate its (relative) strength and impact.15 But in the conventional moral or
political understanding of power it is not to be confused with force.16
Thereto Thomas Hobbes and John Locke give us excellent examples. On one
hand, in his Leviathan, Hobbes demonstrated that power or potentia are not only
virtual or potential. That which provides us with power can only be defined by
power itself, which is to say that we must exercise power in order to see its fruits.17
Hobbes distinguishes—both in his first English edition from 1651, and in his
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Latin version from 1668—natural and instrumental powers.18 On the other hand,
Locke studied power from a totally different angle; in exposing the uselessness of
the concept of innate ideas, he explained how the idea of power arises in the human
mind. As Michael Jacovides explored “The Origin of the Idea of Power,” Locke
thus tried to retrace not so much a history of an idea as, starting with the classic
Locke’s Essay On Human Understanding and especially the 21st chapter Of Power,
he attempted to familiarize us with a process in which “we build the idea of power
out gathered by witnessing agents causing changes.”19 Locke makes this process
particularly intelligible thanks to a clear form of discourse and an exemplary ar-
gument divided into the following sections: “This Idea how got,” “Power, active
and passive,” “Power includes Relation,” “The clearest Idea of active Power had
from Spirit,” “Will and Understanding two Powers in Mind or Spirit,” etc.20 Locke
puts particular emphasis on liberty (“Liberty, what,” “Liberty belongs not the
Will,” and “Liberty is freedom to execute what is willed”). Here Locke clearly de-
marcated concepts such as liberty and freedom, will and desire, to allow for the
main arguments found in such titles as “Government of our Passions the right Im-
provement of Liberty” and “Active and passive power, in motions and in think-
ing.”21
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See: M. Jacovides: Locke’s Construction of the Idea of Power. In: Studies in the History and Philosophy
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The notion of power attracts the attention of both Hobbes and Locke for var-
ious reasons, leading to differing individual interpretations. Nevertheless, in the
shadow of these interpretations is religion. And as Bacon—referring to the divine
sovereignty—uses the term potestas, so Hobbes—referring to the man—customs
the term potentia. In contrast, the “power” of Locke is closely linked with the con-
cept of freedom and volition. In the background of these different interpretations
was the doctrinal change in the Anglican Church in 17th century and the accept-
ance of the Catholic understanding of “free will.” William Uzgalis draws our at-
tention to this theological change in his comment on Locke’s chapter “Of Power.”
From this scope we can better understand the “determinism” of Hobbes, and the
ambivalent approach of Locke to the dogma of liberum arbitrium. However, the
abandonment of the Protestantism negation of free will that had been typical for
Lutherans or Calvinists (within the doctrine of predestination), opened new pos-
sibilities for interpreting both freedom and will. 22 But as Uzgalis notes: 
Liberty comes from the power either to carry out a volition or not to do so.
Locke, though not saying so explicitly, is attacking the doctrine of freedom of
the will where the paramount question is about the freedom of volition. Locke
thinks that this emphasis on volition is a mistake, for simply having volition is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition of liberty. Having the volition and
having the power to carry it out (or not) are jointly sufficient for liberty. 23
Therefore reference to the Catholic understanding of free will seems to be crucial
for understanding the modern vicissitudes of the notion of power. It is not so
much language, and still less ethnicity or nationality, but religion that will be de-
cisive for the development of the concept from the 18th century onwards. Looking
at how the British concept evolved, we can see the conceptual transition from the
reference to God in the sense of potestas in the direction to man in the sense of po-
tentia, or “small power” as it is called by Hobbes, or power, tout court, by Locke.
Combining or demarcation power with force (as potentia or potestas) in the early
See: W. Uzgalis: Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding. A Reader’s Guide, London: Contin-
uum 2007, p. 55: “It is worth nothing that the debate about free will and determinism occurred
during this period both in the theological and the scientific domains. Free will was a Catholic doc-
trine. Luther and Calvin, the Protestant reformers, rejected free will in favor of divine determinism
and predestination. If one considers omnipotence to be one of God’s properties, it is easy to see how
complete determinism of the created world might follow from this. Thomas Hobbes was both a the-
ological and a scientific determinist. The Anglican Church, which was supposed to be a Protestant
church, abandoned Lutheran and Calvinist determinism in favor of free will a decade or so before
the publication (without the author’s permission) of Hobbes’s exchange with Bishop Bramhall in
1654. One of the points that Hobbes makes in defense of his position is that the leaders of the Protes-
tants, Luther and Calvin, were determinists. Bramhall’s rejection of this claim is quite implausible.
Hobbes is also remarkable in drawing the determinist implications from the work of Galileo.” 




Modern Times has nothing to do with the particular English, French or German
attitudes of philosophers, but with religious and as well doctrinal (Protestant or
Catholic) understandings of the world and of the place of a man therein. There-
fore, Bacon’s domestication (from Latin roots) of the very notion of scientia as or-
dered knowledge, and this without any religious or confessional connotation,24
was perhaps more meritorious than the announcement Ipsa scientia potestas est !
The foundations of the modern concept of power, established by Hobbes and
Locke, created fertile ground for the further growth of the idea in the 18th century.
Uzgalis highlights the importance of Locke’s contribution in two principal ways:
first for physics and secondly for ethical and political issues: 
Chapter XXI ‘Power,’ the longest chapter in the Essay, is important for several
reasons. First, it takes us from the inherent properties of physical objects and
space and time to a discussion of causality, or how physical objects affect one
another. Analogously, it takes us in respect of minds from the reception and
construction of ideas to volition and action. It is in this context that we get
Locke’s discussion of free will and determinism and our evaluation of acts as
good and evil.25
David van Mill emphasizes the significance of Hobbes’s contribution as follows:
There is a tendency to think of Hobbes’s notion of power simply in political
terms. Michael [sic] Foucault, for example, suggests that Hobbes’s notion of
power is insufficient because it is a top-down concept in which the sovereign
imposes his will from his position of political authority. Instead, Foucault sug-
gests that power is a more fluid, pervasive phenomenon that rises from the bot-
tom as well as falls from the top. […] In fact, Hobbes has a much more
sophisticated concept of power than Foucault suggests, and when he talks of
power he rarely discusses it in strictly political terms; instead he notes its per-
vasive qualities in civil society, and in the state of nature. If power resides in
the latter condition then it clearly cannot only refer to the exercise of political
See: Ph. Büttgen / R. Imbach / U. J. Schneider / J. Selderhuis: Einleitung, Doctrina als Norm und
als Form. Entwurf einer Fragestallung / Introduction. La doctrine comme forme et comme norme.
Esquisse de questionnaire. In: Vera Doctrina. Zur Begriffsgeschichte der Lehre von Augustinus bis
Descartes / L’idée de doctrine d’Augustin à Descartes, ed. by Ph. Büttgen / R. Imbach / U. J. Schneider
/ J. Selderhuis, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 123, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 2009, p. 10: “L’his-
toire de la doctrine embrasse ainsi la formation des savoirs et celle des identités religieuses à la fin du
Moyen Age et à l’époque moderne. Dans l’invocation, permanente en ce temps-là, de la ‘vraie, saine
et droite doctrine’, elle rassemble, entre autres, l’histoire des clergés, de l’université, de la catéchèse,
l’histoire de la censure et du contrôle des idées, l’histoire de la formation des sectes, tendances et
écoles philosophiques, théologiques, scientifiques, l’histoire des intellectuels et des savants. Ce sont
là quelques-uns des lieux de doctrine qui seront explorés. Forme et norme, les deux aspects se re-
trouvent dans nos deux titres: Vera doctrina et Sacra doctrina.” See especially Th. Gontier: Doctrine
et science dans les Essais de Montaigne. In: ibid., pp. 343–364.




authority. If we carefully examine what Hobbes says about power we find that
he focuses on the individual and on complex social relations not on the sover-
eign. The overriding, albeit instrumental drive for Hobbes, is the desire for
power, broadly defined as a person’s ‘present means, to obtain some future ap-
parent Good.’ This definition is broken down into instrumental and natural
power, the latter being the ‘eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind,’ and
the former the instruments that our natural capacities have helped us acquire
and that in turn help us to gain even more power; that is, more means of at-
taining future goods.26
The assumptions of social order set out in the political philosophy of Charles Louis
de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, presented in The Spirit of the
Laws in 1748,27 and in the epoch-making Europeanization of Russia as outlined
by John Brown in 1764 for Catherine the Great, played a key role in the modern
meaning of a democratic state and the separation of powers.28 The understanding
of power in the eighteenth century was influenced not only by Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s (1762) Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right,29 but also—and
perhaps more so—by two key issues of the century launched by the Free Society
for Economy and Agriculture in Petersburg in 1766, and as within the class for
philosophy of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1781. The first compe-
tition was devoted to the question of “serfdom” and “peasant property”; the second
competition, in turn, introduced the question proposed by Frederick the Great:
Does the sovereign have the right to deceive the people? (Est-ce que le souverain a
le droit de tromper le peuple ?)30 As an answer to the first question, François Marie
Arouet de Voltaire proposed two dissertations: one in Latin and the other in
French.31 The Latin essay was written anonymously under the motto: Si populus
See: D. van Mill: Liberty, Rationality, and Agency in Hobbes’s Leviathan, pp. 213f.
See: Ch. de Montesquieu: De l’esprit des loix ou du rapport que les loix doivent avoir avec la constitution
de chaque gouvernement, les mœurs, le climat, la religion, le commerce, &c. à quoi l’auteur a ajouté. Des
recherches nouvelles sur les loix romaines touchant les successions, sur les loix françoises, & sur les loix féo-
dales, Genève: chez Barillot et fils 1748.
See: M. Kowalewicz: Eine ‘gute Aufferziehung’ als Aufgabe der Aufklärung oder als Staatsangelegen-
heit? Zur Rezeption einiger französischer und britischer Ansätze der Pädagogik in Deutschland und
Russland im 18. Jahrhundert. In: Interdisziplinarität und Internationalität. Wege und Formen der Re-
zeption der französischen und britischen Aufklärung in Deutschland und Rußland im 18. Jahrhundert,
ed. by H. Duchhardt / C. Scharf, Mainz: Philipp von Zabern 2004, p. 254.
See: J.-J. Rousseau: Du contrat social ou, Principes du droit politique, Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey
1762.
See: W. Kraus: Eine politische Preisfrage im Jahre 1780. In: id.: Das wissenschaftliche Werk, ed. on
behalf of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften by M. Neumann, vol. III: Auf-
klärung III: Deutschland und Spanien, ed. by M. Fontius, Berlin / New York: Walter de Gruyter 1996,
pp. 192–202.








dives, Rex dives (if the people are rich, the king is rich), and was subsequently placed
by Voltaire in summary form in his Philosophical Dictionary (Dictionnaire
philosophique portatif)32 and in Questions sur l’Encyclopédie 33 in the article devoted
to property.34 The question posed by the Berlin Academy can be traced back to
the initiative of Jean le Rond d’Alembert, which he proposed to the king in a letter
on December, 18th 1769.35
The significant queries raised in Russia in the 1730s (initially only around the
Imperial Academy of Sciences in Petersburg)36 and again in the 1760s, during the
reign of Catherine the Great (through the Europe-wide proposals of education
and legislative reforms for Russia and also the above mentioned question of the
possible abolition of serfdom in Europe’s “laboratory of Enlightenment”) were
particularly momentous for all of the civilized world and in many ways outshined
the overrated debate about the core of Auklärung in Germany that evolved two
decades later in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1783 (containing pieces by such
great minds as Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, Gotthold Ephraïm Les-
sing or Moses Mendelssohn).37 It was also in Russia in the 1760s that Leonhard
Euler pointed out the concepts of freedom and power as part of his project Letters
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See: V. Somov: Voltaire et le concours de la Société libre d’économie de Pétersbourg. In: Les Archives
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See: Œuvres de Frédéric le Grand, vol. XXIV, Berlin: Imprimerie Royale (R. Decker) 1854, p. 467:
“La question: s’il se peut faire que le people se passé de fables dans un système religieux, mériterait
bien, Sire, d’être propose par une académie telle que la vôtre. Je pense, pour moi, qu’il faut toujours
enseigner la vérité aux homes, et qu’il n’y a jamais d’avantage réel à les tromper. L’Académie de Berlin,
en proposant cette question pour le sujet du prix de métaphysique, se ferait, je crois, beaucoup d’hon-
neur, et se distinguerait des autres compagnies littéraires, qui n’ont encore que trop de préjugés.”
See: M. Kowalewicz: Die Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Petersburg oder die trianguläre
kulturelle Begegnung. In: Kulturtransfer Polen-Deutschland. Wechselbeziehungen in Sprache, Kultur
und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, ed. by K. Sauerland, Bonn: Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen 2001,
p. 73: “Die akademische Gemeinschaft lebte keineswegs in einer perfekten Harmonie. Seit ihren
Anfängen wurde die Sozietät durch die Streitigkeiten Basler Gelehrter um die Prinzipien der Auf-
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doch die deutschsprachige Gelehrtengemeinde immer eine exemplarische Einigkeit bewahren.”
See: Kant / Erhard / Hamann / Herder / Lessing / Mendelssohn / Riem / Schiller / Wieland: Was ist







to a German Princess, On Different Subjects in Physics and Philosophy (Lettres à une
princesse d’Allemagne sur divers sujets de physique et de philosophie).38 Euler contested
the French materialism that was dramatically rampant thanks to Julien Offray de
La Mettrie at the Academy in Berlin, and because of Denis Diderot and Melchior
Grimm who were in Russia, a country that was particularly exposed to the threat
of massive intellectual contamination.39 Euler takes part in the debate with mate-
rialism on behalf on the extremely influential German-speaking academic scene
in Russia, which was deeply rooted in Protestantism.40 His cosmology presented
in Letters to the German Princess, was written in French, the language of Euler’s
philosophical adversaries and the language of physics at that time. The reflection
on power contained in this cosmology was tremendously important as it intro-
duced an important element into the debate on potentia and potestas which had
until then been clearly delimited in French as “potentiality” and “force.” Therefore
in the 18th century not only was physics shaped on the basis of the French language
but so too were fundamental philosophical concepts. As Letters to the German
Princess reveal, this shift influenced on the one hand the main issues of the century
in physics such as gravity, inertia, force or electricity, and on the other, liberty,
freedom, revelation, creation, and power.41 In the letter on Influence of the Liberty
of Spirits upon Events (Letter LXXXVII) Euler stated:
But, if we allow to the souls of men and of animals the power of producing
motion in their bodies, which their organization alone would not have pro-
duced, the system of the universe is not a mere machine, and events do not
necessarily take place as in the preceding case.42
See: L. Euler: Lettres à une princesse d’Allemagne sur divers sujets de physique et de philosophie, 2 vol.,
Saint Petersbourg: Imprimerie de l’Academie Impériale des Sciences 1768–1772.
See: M. Kowalewicz: Quelques aspects des réseaux de langue allemande autour de l’Académie des
sciences de Pétersbourg. In: La Culture française et les archives russes: une image de l’Europe au XVIIIe
siècle, études réunises par G. Dulac avec le concours de D. Tourisson et celui de M. Piha et M. Re-
verseau, Ferney-Voltaire: Centre international d’Etude du XVIIIe siècle 2004, pp. 211–237.
See: an abridged version of lectures given on Twelfth International Enlightenment Congress: Knowl-
edge, Techniques and Cultures in the 18th Century in Montpellier in July 2007 (“Lettres à une
Princesse d'Allemagne et la contribution de Leonhard Euler dans le domaine de la philosophie,” Or-
dinary Session, 8: “Philosophy in Europe”), in the framework of the Kolloquium für Wissenschafts-
theorie und -geschichte am Institut für Philosophie I der Ruhr-Universität Bochum in November
2010, and at the symposion at the University of Picardy in Amiens on “Prohibitions” in March 2012:
M. H. Kowalewicz: La cosmologie de Leonhard Euler et l’exclusion de la réflexion religieuse du dis-
cours philosophique en France du XVIIIe. In: Les Interdits, ed. by D. Buschinger, Amiens: Presses
du ‘Centre d’Etudes Médiévales’ Université de Picardie – Jules Verne 2012, pp. 126–133.
See: ibid.
See: L. Euler: Letters of Euler On Different Subjects in Physics and Philosophy. Adressed to a German
Princess, trans. by H. Hunter in two volumes, London: Printed for Murray and Highley [et al.]
21802,ol. II, p. 334; see the original French version in:  id.: Lettres à une Princesse d’Allemagne: Sur







With an emphasis on liberty, Euler draws a sharp line between an ordinary ma-
chine and a thinking being. He reconciles the assumptions of free will (volition)
with both sin and predestination:
Another objection, however, is started against liberty, founded on the divine
prescience. God, it is said, foresaw, from all eternity, every resolution which I
should form, and every action which I should do, during every instant of my
life. […] Thus the prescience of God by no means encroaches on my liberty,
and all my actions remain equally at liberty, whether God foresaw them or
not.43
There were, however, less physical issues that divided the French materialists and
German-speaking Protestant scholars. These physical or philosophical arguments
were not difficult to accept by the French community of scholars and thinkers in
Paris or in Berlin, but in approaching a possible philosophical consensus, religion
increasingly became a bone of contention. These different attitudes were also re-
flected in the context of purely physical (not only philosophical) issues. For ex-
ample, this is attested to by the two projects of the Supplement to 18th century
Encyclopedias: the project of Denis Diderot and D’Alembert (known as Encyclo-
pédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers or also called the
Encyclopedia of Paris and the Encyclopedia of Bouillon)44 and the project of Fortu-
nato Bartolommeo de Felice (known as the Encyclopedia of Yverdon).45 The first of
these endeavors reflected materialistic tendencies, while the other was strongly
rooted in religion. Thus, these two significant and competing encyclopedic projects
differed firstly in reference to religion, and secondly in confessional tradition.
While the first started the project in the newly unified Catholic France after the
revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the second focused on the interpretation of re-
ligious doctrine in Protestant Switzerland. It was thus not the language that differed
et universitaires Romandes 2003, p. 164: “Mais dès qu’on accorde aux ames des hommes et des ani-
maux quelquez pouvoir sur leurs corps; pour y produire les mouvemens, que la seule organisation
des corps n’auroit pas produit, le systême du monde n’est plus une pure machine, et tous les évene-
mens n’y arrivent pas nécessairement, comme dans le cas précédent.”
See: id.: Letters, vol. II, p. 330f. See also the French version in: id.: Lettres à une Princesse d’Allemagne,
pp. 162f.: “On forme cependant encore la liberté une autre objection tirée de la Préscience de Dieu.
On dit que Dieu a prévu de toute éternité toutes les résolutions ou actions que je ferai pendant tous
les enstans de ma vie. […] Ainsi la Préscience de Dieu n’ote rien à ma liberté; et toutes mes actions
demeurent également libres, soit que Dieu les ait prévues, ou non.”
See: Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, par une Société de gens
de lettres; mis en ordre & publié par M. Diderot; & quant à la partie mathématique, par M. D'Alem-
bert, 36 vol., Paris, [then] Neuchâtel, [then] Paris, [then] Amsterdam: chez Briasson, ... David l'aîné,
... Le Breton, ... Durand 1751–1780.
See: Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines, mis en ordre par M.





in these two projects, because both were edited in French, but rather the “doctrine,”
that is, the understanding of knowledge in general in classic Latin before the Ref-
ormation and the “teaching of the church” after the Reformation.46 After the pub-
lication of Euler’s Letters, the editors of both encyclopedic enterprises, Jean-Baptiste
René Robinet in Bouillon and De Felice in Yverdon, approached the Imperial
Academy of Sciences with a request to provide articles to these projects. The his-
torical record suggests that Leonhard Euler and Johann Albrecht Euler, son of the
great Euler and perpetual secretary of the Academy, acceded to the request of De
Felice and wrote an extensive article that was crucial from the standpoint of physics
(especially related to the notion of “force”).47 But it is also the very concept of
“power” that has been included in a number of ways, as evidenced by the two per-
spectives of the Encyclopedia editors.48
Within the Encyclopedia of D’Alembert and Diderot49 we find a general article
on the concept of power as conceived within natural law and politics, but also ar-
ticles by Louis de Jaucourt on “paternal power” and “power understood as military
art,”50 as well as an article by Antoine-Gaspard Boucher d’Argis on “power in ju-
risprudence.”51 The article on force was developed in terms of Voltaire’s aesthetics52
See above note 24.
See article “force,” provided to the Supplement of the Encyclopedia of De Felice: [L. Euler / J. A.
Euler]: Force. In: Encyclopédie ou ou Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances humaines, Sup-
plément, Yverdon: [F.-B. de Félice], vol. 3, pp. 555–558; see also id.: Forces perturbatrices. In: ibid.,
pp. 558f. See also the site dedicated to this enterprise of De Felice: http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/f/F44577.php [15.12.15], which disclosed the authors of this contribution: “D’autres
n’ont écrit qu’un seul article, comme Leonhard et Johann Albrecht Euler (article ‘Force’).”
See above notes 38 and 39.
See: [unknown]: Pouvoir. In: Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,
vol. 5, p. 255: “s. m. (Droit nat. & politiq.) Le consentement des hommes réunis en société, est le
fondement du pouvoir. Celui qui ne s’est établi que par la force, ne peut subsister que par la force;
jamais elle ne peut conférer de titre, & les peuples conservent toujours le droit de réclamer contre
elle. En établissant les sociétés, les hommes n’ont renoncé à une portion de l’indépendance dans la-
quelle la nature les a fait naître, que pour s’assurer les avantages qui résultent de leur soumission à
une autorité légitime & raisonnable; ils n’ont jamais prétendu se livrer sans réserve à des maîtres ar-
bitraires, ni donner les mains à la tyrannie & à l’oppression, ni conférer à d’autres le droit de les
rendre malheureux. Le but de tout gouvernement, est le bien de la société gouvernée. Pour prévenir
l’anarchie, pour faire exécuter les lois, pour protéger les peuples, pour soutenir les foibles contre les
entreprises des plus forts, il a fallu que chaque société établît des souverains qui fussent revêtus d’un
pouvoir suffisant pour remplir tous ces sujets. L’impossibilité de prévoir toutes les circonstances où
la société se trouveroit, a déterminé les peuples à donner plus ou moins d'étendue au pouvoir qu’ils
accordoient à ceux qu'ils chargeoient du soin de les gouverner.
See: L. de Jacourt: Pouvoir paternel. In: ibid.,  pp. 256f. See also  the  entry  on  military power: id.:
Pouvoir. [… ] (Art militaire). In: ibid., p. 256.  
See: A.-G. Boucher d’Argis: Pouvoir. […] (Jurisprud.). In: ibid., p. 256. 
See: Voltaire: Force. In: ibid., vol. 7, p. 109: “s. f. (Gramm. & Littér.) ce mot a été transporté du
simple au figuré. Force se dit de toutes les parties du corps qui sont en mouvement, en action; la force









and in terms of force in mechanics, force of inertia, and energy (what Leibniz
called force vive) by d’Alembert himself. 53
In the Encyclopedia of De Felice the concept of power was placed at the root
of natural law (“We mean by that word a moral superiority of one person over an-
other or several others, granted by law; & we give the name puissance to name a
physical superiority that is in force” 54) and further developed within political law,
where the emphasis was placed on legislative and executive power.55
In the late 18th century, Immanuel Kant added to the debate on “force” the
so-called Urteilskraft and bildende Kraft, which thanks to Herder and Hegel de-
veloped metaphysical meanings.56 The clear distinction in English and in French
between “force” and “power” led to confusion regarding the third critique of Im-
manuel Kant, the Kritik der Urteilskraft, habitually translated into English as the
Critique of the Power of Jugement or Critique of Jugement, tout court. Just as in Span-
ish, the French translation limited Kritik der Urteilskraft to the faculty of judgment,
and the Kantian text is known in the French-speaking world as Critique de la fac-
ulté de jugement. For German Idealism and the Humboldt University’s project, a
key role would also be played by the Kantian notion of Einbildungskraft, a loan
translation from Latin vis imaginations, translated into English as “fancy,” “imag-
ination,” or “imaginativeness,” and into French as faculté d’imaginer, fantasie, ima-
gination (créatrice), or inventivité. Although the concept of “force” was often used
in the 18th century in the context of art and aesthetics, from the mid-19th century
onwards the demarcation between “force” and “power” became less and less promi-
nent under the influence of German language in physics and philosophy in general.
This issue is explored within the Dictionary of Untranslatables.57
For that reason, finding the German-language equivalent of “power” can cause
greater difficulties than could have been expected at first glance. The Dictionary
ceres, des poumons, de la voix; à force de bras.”
See: d’Alembert: Force en Mechanique. In: ibid., p. 110; see: id.: Force d’inertie. In: ibid., p. 112;
see: id.: Force vive, ou Force des Corps. In: ibid.
See: F. B. De Felice: Pouvoir. In: Encyclopédie ou ou Dictionnaire universel raisonné des connoissances
humaines, Yverdon: [F.-B. de Félice] 1774, vol. 34, p. 818: “(N), s.m., Droit Nat. Nous entondons
par ce mot une supériorité morale d’une personne sur une autre ou sur plusieurs autres, accordées
par les lois; & nous donnons le nom le nom de puissance à une supériorité physique qui consiste
dans la force.”
The entire article devoted to power was written by De Felice, including sections on marital and pa-
ternal authority, see: ibid., pp. 818–839. 
See: F. Kaulbach: Der Begriff der Kraft in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie: bewegende und bildende
Kraft. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. by J. Ritter / K. Gründer / G. Gabriel, Basel:
Schwabe Verlag 1976, vol. 4, p. 1180: “Die Philosophie versuchte in Zusammenarbeit mit der neu-
zeitlichen Naturwissenschaft und ihrer Rede von der K. die Begriffe der Physik und die ihnen ent-
sprechenden Erscheinungen durch Zurückführung auf ihren ‘Grund’, auf das ‘Wesen’ der Sache
selbst zu rechtfertigen. Der in diese Bewegung hineingezogene physikalische Begriff der K. gewann
metaphysische Bedeutung.”







of Philosophical Terms by Elmar Waibl and Philip Herdina does not appear to be
much help here, where power—depending on the context—can mean Kraft (in
the sense of potency, faculty, ability, and capacity), but also Macht, Herrschaft or
Gewalt (in the sense of might, domination, influence), Vermögen (as ability, ca-
pacity), and finally Mächtigkeit (e.g. in mathematics).58 This translational polysemy
is confirmed—among others— by the entries in the Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie concerning Kraft,59 Macht,60 and Gewalt.61 Certainly, the common de-
nominator linking power to Kraft in the sense of potentia, or vis is the Greek notion
of dunamis [δύναµις] that means strength . 
Unlike the Dictionary of Untranslatables, the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philoso-
phie provides the etymological roots of the force (Kraft) concept exclusively in
Greek dunamis [δύναµις] and not in the energeia [ἐνέργεια] or entelekheia
[ἐντελέχεια].62 Therefore, in modern German philosophy we have to deal in turn
with the so-called bewegende and bildende Kraft mentioned above.63 The interpre-
tation of the concept of Kraft begins to get complicated, which, in the light of
modern philosophy (since Leibniz, who wrote in French of force primitive, or start-
ing by Wolff, who writes about Kraft, as Quelle der Veränderungen) increasingly
refers to concept of change (Wirkung). Therefore the concept of “force” as Kraft
signifies more than does “power.” However, the two continued to generally be un-
derstood as synonymous, particularly on the grounds of 18th century physics within
the French language in which the two concepts were increasingly less clearly de-
limited, something that is seen within the substantial encyclopedic enterprises of
Diderot and D’Alembert, and De Felice. 
The authors of the entries within both the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philoso-
phie and the Dictionary of Untranslatables point out a dynamic history of the con-
cept of “force.” Whereas Friedrich Kaulbach underlines the role of German
Idealism,64 Françoise Balibar even tried to understand this dynamic development
by developing a richer historical perspective:
See: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms / Wörterbuch philosophischer Fachbegriffe, ed. By E. Waibl / Ph.
Herdina, Wien: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandels AG 2011, p. 928.
See: M. Jammer: Kraft. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4, pp. 1177–1180; see also F.
Kaulbach: II. Der Begriff der Kraft in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie: bewegende und bildende Kraft.
In: ibid., pp. 1180–1184.
See: K. Röttgers: Macht. In: ibid., vol. 5 (1980), pp. 585–604; K. Lichtblau: II. M.-Theorien vom
deutschen Idealismus bis zur Gegenwart. In: ibid., pp. 604–617; W. Goerdt: III. Byzanz und Os-
teuropa. In: ibid., pp. 617–622; H. Rodingen: IV. […] marxistisch-leninistische […] [Auffassung].
In: ibid., pp. 622–625; W. E. Mühlmann: V. Der M. – Begriff der östlichen Religionen und des
Polytheismus. In: ibid., pp. 625–629; A. Seigfried: VI. Judentum und Neues Testament. In: ibid.,
pp. 629–631; R. Hauser: VII. […] Theologie. In: ibid., p. 631.
See: K. Röttgers: Gewalt. In: ibid., vol. 3 (1974), pp. 562–570.
See: ibid., vol. 4, p. 1177; Dictionary of Untranslatables, p. 2287; Vocabulaire européen des philosophies,
p. 457.
See: F. Kaulbach: II. Der Begriff der Kraft in der neuzeitlichen Philosophie.









The word ‘energy’ followed an evolution that was the reverse of the evolution
of ‘force.’ It is derived from the Greek energeia [ἐνέϱγεια]; we know that Aris-
totle, in his study of movement, contrasts energy with potentiality and that
this duality deeply marked the development of European philosophy and sci-
ence until the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the word ‘energy’
came to be used only in literature, ‘force’ having supplanted it in discussions
of the natural world.65
While Barbara Cassin in his Dictionary of Untranslatables under the entry “force”
devotes attention to the general relationship between such concepts as dunamis
[δύναµις], energeia [ἐνέργεια], and entelekheia [ἐντελέχεια],66 Françoise Balibar, au-
thor of the main article, is trying to find, in more depth than is noticeable in the
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, an explanation for the dramatically increas-
ing polysemy of the concept of power in French (and also in English) as Kraft
under the influence of physics, a field that had been grow since the 18th century.
She noted at once that the clear demarcation between “force” as energy and “power”
as potentiality emerging with Aristotle, was maintained in English and in French
as well as in other Roman languages only until the mid-19th century. Due to the
influence of the German language, the intricacies of terminology grew:
In every European language, the word ‘force’ ( English ) / force ( French ) / Kraft
( German ) underwent an abrupt transformation with the publication in 1847
of the dissertation ‘Über die Erhaltung der Kraft’ [On the conservation of force]
by Hermann von Helmholtz. More precisely, whereas in its vernacular usage,
the word remained synonymous with power in the vague sense of the term ( as
in the expressions ‘having the force of law,’ ‘la forza del destino’ ), its conceptual
usage, which until then had been just as vague, was suddenly, ‘by the force of
mathematics,’ radicalized. After 1847 the word may have two translations:
‘force’/force/Kraft ( directed action producing or tending to produce movement,
in conformity with the laws of Newtonian dynamics ), and ‘energy’/énergie/En-
ergie ( scalar, that is, nondirected, magnitude obeying a metaphysical principle
of conservation, just like ‘matter’ ). The different manners of referring in Ger-
man to the conservation of energy ( ‘die Erhaltung der Kraft’ / ‘die Konstanz
ferent kinds of theories that introduce new interpretations of the notion. The propositions of Johann
Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel, Adam Müller
von Nitterdorf, Franz von Baader, Heinrich Gotthardt von Treitschke and Johann Gustav Bernhard
Droysen illustrate the dynamics of this process, see: F. Kaulbach: II. Der Begriff der Kraft in der
neuzeitlichen Philosophie.
See: Force. In: Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, p. 457; see also in the English version id.: Force.
In: Dictionary of Untranslatables, p. 2288.
See: B. Cassin: “Dunamis”, “energeia”, “entelekheia” et la definition aristotélicienne du mouvement.
In: Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, pp. 458f.; see also in the English version id.: Dunamis, en-





der Energie’ / ‘Energiesatz’ ) are traces left by the difficult development of this
notion.67
We can observe the gradual spread of the use of the concept of Kraft on the basis
of German language (not only in relation to Kant, but also to the growing impor-
tance of German physics). This conceptualization contributed to a polysemy in
those languages that use terminology derived directly from Latin, founded on the
notions of power and pouvoir. Balibar examines in detail the vicissitudes that con-
tribute to the changing understanding of power in French even in the second half
of the 18th century, as seen in the Letters to the German Princess by Leonhard Euler.
Here Balibar is quite right, but the emphasis on language alone does not fully ex-
plain the changes taking place in relation to such concepts as “power” and “force”
in French, the language of scientific communication in the 18th century, particu-
larly in physics. Balibar concludes: “Thus, the ambiguities of the word Kraft are
not, and never will be, rigorously the same as those pertaining to the French and
English word ‘force’.”68 It is also true that “The meaning of the word in vernacular
speech then expands, and it acquires a vague technical sense—even, in the last
thirty years, a technocratic one.”69 In spite of this, it is not so much the nationality
of Euler or the special manner of thinking in terms of the German language that
will be decisive in this case, but rather, Protestantism will determine the positions
of Euler that encourage the subsequent multi-dimensionality of the concept of
power on the grounds the German language.70 The astonishment of Balibar is sim-
ilar to the initial reactions of the academic community in Paris after the publication
of Euler’s Letters including the ambiguous approach to this text especially by Marie
Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, marquis de Condorcet, who arbitrarily censored
See: F. Balibar: Force. In: Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, p. 457; see also in the English version
id.: Force. In: Dictionary of Untranslatables, pp. 2287–2288.
See: ibid., p. 2301; see: id.: Force. In: Vocabulaire européen des philosophies, p. 458.
See: ibid.: “La signification du mot dans la langue vernaculaire s’élargit alors et il acquiert un sens
technique, voire, ces trente dernières années, technocratique.”
One can ask if the following mocking drift was really required in this place if that truly brings a lot
about: “Il est amusant de constater que dans ce register de langue qui prétend à l’exactitude scienti-
fique, le sens du mot est complètement dénaturé – comme dans l’expression économies d’énergie,
qui constitue, à proprement parler, un contresens puisqu’une quantité qui, par définition, ‘se conserve’
ne  saurait être ‘économisée’. Ce manquement aux règles élémentaires de la logique a le mérite de ré-
véler une difficulté théorique: l’idée de conservation est une idée tout aussi, sinon plus, savante que
celle d’énergie ou de force et, en tant que telle, elle est inévitablement malmenée par la langue cou-
rante.” See: ibid., p. 458; see also the English version: id.: Force. In: Dictionary of Untranslatables,
pp. 2298f.:  “It is amusing to note that in this register of language that claims scientific exactitude,
the sense of the word is completely denatured—as in the expression ‘energy economizing’, which,
strictly speaking, is a contradiction, since a quantity that by definition is ‘conserved’ cannot be ‘econ-
omized’. This failure to abide by the basic rules of logic has the virtue of revealing a theoretical dif-
ficulty: the idea of conservation is one that is just as erudite as, if not more than, that of energy, and






the passages of Letters that he considered to be non-philosophical, that is, pertain-
ing to religion. It is worth noting that such misunderstandings arose in large part
on the basis of differing religious conceptualizations of the world.
This also largely confirms the analysis of Byung-Chul Han, presented in his
theoretical essay devoted to the concept of Macht,71 one of the German-language
equivalent of “power,” provided by the Dictionary of Philosophical Terms by Waibl
and Herdina.72 In the preamble to his recent approach Han sketches the misun-
derstandings related to the notion of Macht: 
As regards the concept of power (Macht) there is still a theoretical chaos. The
obviousness of the phenomenon is offset by a total lack of clarity of the concept.
For some it means oppression. For others, it is a constructive element of com-
munication. The legal, political and sociological ideas of power (Macht) stand
in contrast with each other, and are not reconciled with each other. The idea
of power (Macht) is easily connected with freedom or with constraints and
force. For some, power (Macht) is based on joint action. For others it is under-
stood to in relationship to struggle. Some draw a sharp distinction between
power and violence. For others, violence is nothing more than an intensified
form of power (Macht). Power is often associated with the law, but often with
arbitrariness.73
In his article within the Dictionary of Untranslatables on the two key concepts of
German philosophy, Macht and Gewalt, Marc de Launay approved of Han’s analy-
sis.74 De Launay outlines the evolutionary history of the Latin terms potestas and
potentia towards Macht and Gewalt and suggests solutions to challenges within re-
ligious discussions around these notions:
When Luther comments on Romans 13 ( ‘Let every person be subject to the
governing authorities’), he writes that ‘one must not resist authority (Obrigkeit)
by force ( Gewalt), but only by confessing the truth’ […]. This interpretation
underlines one of the connotations—rebellious force—that gradually, and es-
See: B.-Ch. Han, Was ist Macht?, Stuttgart. Philipp Reclam 2005.
See above note 51.
[Transl. by M. H. Kowalewicz], see: B.-Ch. Han, Was ist Macht?, p. 7: “Hinsichtlich des Machtbe-
griffs herrscht immer noch ein theoretisches Chaos. Der Selbstverständlichkeit des Phänomens steht
eine totale Unklarheit des Begriffs gegenüber. Für den einen bedeutet sie Unterdrückung. Für den
anderen ist sie ein konstruktives Element der Kommunikation. Die juristische, die politische und
die soziologische Vorstellung von der Macht stehen einander und unversöhnt gegenüber. Die Macht
wird bald mit der Freiheit, bald mit dem Zwang in Verbindung gebracht. Für die einen beruht
die Macht auf dem gemeinsamen Handeln. Für die anderen steht sie mit dem Kampf in Beziehung.
Die einen grenzen die Macht von der Gewalt scharf ab. Für die anderen ist die Gewalt nichts anderes
al seine intensivierte Form der Macht. Die Macht wird bald mit dem Recht, bald mit der Willkür
assoziiert.” 






pecially toward the end of the Middle Ages, came to be added to the traditional
meaning of Gewalt, which originally referred to the entire range of acts con-
nected with the exercise of temporal power: administering, reigning, organizing
( the root of the term goes back to the Latin valere). It is clear that the associated
notions of potestas and of vis ( force ) are directly linked to this exercise of power,
and because Gewalt implies the use of force, the meaning of the term moves
easily, by extension, toward the idea of violence, that is, a rebellious, even rev-
olutionary, force exerted against power ( Macht). Gewalt and Macht thus share
the idea of potestas, with Gewalt inflecting this idea toward vis and violentia,
while Macht tends more toward potentia.75
It is interesting to note the extent to which the two projects mentioned above,
that of Han and that of de Launey, complement each other. De Launay seeks to
address the roots of contemporary thinking about Macht and Gewalt by interpret-
ing and domesticating the concept in French in terms of a translational turn and,
drawing on the conceptual roots of Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber and Hannah Arendt,
trying to pull this common thread to the French philosophy of the second half of
the 20th century (e.g. Georges Sorel). Thanks to the addition of Daniel Hoffmann-
Schwartz (solely in the English version) this thread will continue to Alain Badiou
and Jacques Lacan.76 Han, however, not asking about etymology or genealogy, re-
ferred to the whole range of French-speaking philosophers, and domesticated their
thoughts under the banner of Macht: Georges Bataille, Michel Foucault, Em-
manuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, and Pierre Bourdieu. His starting point is not
so much the so-called Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history, or the history of a con-
cept) but Problemgeschichte (the history of a problem), in the form of Niklas Luh-
mann’s “Klassische Theorie der Macht,” which utilizes the concept of pouvoir as
imported via French lexicographical tools.77 Han attempts to organize the multi-
See: ibid., p. 3935; see also the French version: id.: Macht, Gewalt. In: Vocabulaire européen des
philosophies, p. 747: “Lorsque Luther commente Romains 13 (‘Que chacun se soumette aux autori-
tés…), il écrit qu’‘on ne doit pas résister à l’autorité (Obrigkeit) par la force (Gewalt), mais uniquement
en confessant la vérité’ […]; cette interprétation souligne l’une des connotations – la force rebelle –
venues s’adjoindre peu à peu, et surtout vers la fin du Moyen Age, au sens alors traditionnel de Gewalt
qui désigne d’abord l’ensemble des actes liés à l’exercice du pouvoir temporel: administrer, régner,
organiser (la racine du terme renvoie au latin valere). On comprend qu’à cet exercice soient directe-
ment liées les notions connexes de potestas et de vis (force); et du fait que Gewalt implique l’usage de
la force, le sens du terme glisse, par extension, jusqu’à l’idée de violence, c’est-à-dire l’usage rebelle,
voire révolutionnaire, de la force exercée contre le pouvoir (Macht). Gewalt et Macht se partagent
ainsi l’idée de potestas, Gewalt infléchissant cette idée vers la vis et la violentia, tandis que Macht tend
plutôt vers la potentia.”
See: D. Hoffmann-Schwartz: Forcing (Forçage). In: Dictionary of Untranslatables, pp. 3953–3961.






dimensionality of the concept of Macht on the basis of the German language, by
simultaneously referencing the Germanized French philosophical texts, thereby
building in a very transparent way, the following issues: the logic of power, the
power of semantics, the metaphysics of power, the politics of power and finally,
the ethics of power.
Given this theoretical confusion a more flexible concept of power should be
found, one that would be able to unite the divergent conceptions of power.
Thus to formulate is a basic form of power that is generated by shifting internal
structural elements of different forms. […] In this way the idea of power should
at least take into itself every concept of power that is based on the fact that you
are not sure what it actually is.78
The reasons for this heavy terminological confusion in the understanding of power
or pouvoir, Macht, Kraft, Gewalt and also the different etymological interpretations,
are—on the one hand—the obsessive struggle with religion, something that was
distinctive for 18th century French philosophy (and also natural sciences including
physics), and—on the other—the obsession of German Idealism with the concept
of Kultur, the foundation of 19th century concepts of statehood and science, as
well as the founding of a university in the spirit of Humboldt’s understanding of
the institution. In the 20th century, the clash of these “national obsessions” is clearly
reflected in the widely-promoted ideological concepts of nation, science, and the
role played by each nation in the world. At the root of the present-day interpreta-
tion of the concept of power, understood not only in the context of the duo
Hobbes and Locke, on the one hand as potentia and other potestas, is also a more
fluid understanding of German concepts such as Gewalt, Macht and Kraft. The
separation of powers within democratic statehood is generally expressed through
the concept of power. The rule of law in the German language introduces in this
place a more adequate but sharp nomenclature, one that is perhaps shocking for
the non-German speaking layman, namely, calling powers Gewalten. From this
point of view, the editors of the Dictionary of Untranslatables could formulate the
thesis that “power is of considerable importance in modern moral and political
philosophy, which stresses freedom more than virtues and the ability to coerce
more than authority.”79
[Transl. by M. H. Kowalewicz], see: B.-Ch. Han, Was ist Macht?, p. 7: “Angesichts dieser theoreti-
schen Konfusion soll ein beweglicher Machtbegriff gefunden werden, der die divergierenden Vor-
stellungen von der Macht in sich zu vereinigen vermöchte. Zu formulieren ist also eine Grundform
der Macht, die durch Verschiebung innerer Strukturelemente unterschiedliche Erscheinungsformen
generiert. [...] Dadurch soll der Macht zumindest jene Macht genommen werden, die auf dem Um-
stand beruht, daß man nicht genau weiß, worum es sich eigentlich handelt.”




However, the formation of the “barbarous neologisms” in German mentioned
by Dahl has been useful not only for modern physics, but also for understanding
power also in political terms. Thus, we can accurately define the contexts in which
the concept of power is used in German, which, through the global use of English
in different social and human sciences, lost their contours or—as stated by
Caillois—began to smack of magic, superstition and irrationality, positions against
which the Enlightenment set itself to fight. That knowledge is power, something
that was understood both by Leibniz, the secret counselor of Peter the Great, who
urged the Tsar to elevate the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, and
by Humboldt, who also laid the foundations of national statehood on science and
the idea of the university. In the Middle Ages we see the establishment of an in-
dependent base for the accumulation of the power of knowledge, namely the uni-
versity, which stood between ecclesiastical and secular authority, but also
strengthened the power of both. But it might be worthwhile to put the focus on
authority, as Roger Caillois presented the nature and forms of power.
There is no complete power of duress: consent is still the main principle. What
is it that allows officer to stop drivers at crossroads by simply raising a white
stick? Certainly it is not the physical force of the [acting] agent. Perhaps some
obscure reasoning that traffic need be regulated? This is indeed from where it
would come if all drivers were philosophers. But how many are there who have
considered the issue and, after deliberation, decided to comply with the orders
of the officers? No, they instinctively obey the feebler one, but the one who is
in authority. Such is the image of all power.80
The concepts of power and force, power and energy, Kraft and Energie open up
further possibilities for interpretation, not only from a philosophical point of view.
We can imagine how important it is to emphasize power within psychology and
psychoanalysis, and how the understanding of power is decisive from the point of
view of Augustine and the doctrine of free will, something that can be seen in the
debates around the concept of power in the 17th and 18th centuries. Of particular
importance for French-speaking philosophers and sociologists in the second half
of the 20th century was Marx’s understanding of the concept. This is seen in Bour-
dieu’s famous work Homo academicus, where special attention was devoted to the
[Transl. by M. H. Kowalewicz], see: R. Caillois: Le pouvoir charismatique. Adolf Hitler comme idole
[Referent power: Adolf Hitler as idol]. In: id.: Oeuvres, Paris: Gallimard 2008, p. 315: “Il n’y a pas
de pouvoir entièrement fondé sur la contrainte: le consentement est toujours le principal. Qu’est-ce
qui arrête au carrefour la file des automobiles quand l’agent lève son bâton blanc? Certainement pas
la force physique de l’agent. Quelque obscur raisonnement sur la nécessité que la circulation soit ré-
glementée? C’est en effet là qu’on en arriverait si tous les conducteurs étaient des philosophes. Mais
combien sont-ils qui ont réfléchi au problème et qui ont décidé après délibération de se conformer
aux injonctions des agents? Non, ils obéissent d’instinct au plus faible, mais qui détient l’autorité.
Telle est l’image de tout pouvoir.” 
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“Types of Capital and Forms of Power,”81 and the reproduction of elites: “The
Structure of the Space of the Powers” was divided into two interdependent di-
mensions: “Time and Power.” How important it is—at this point— to return to
Hobbes’s statement Scientia potentia est !, because it relates to civil society, not to
divinity, as in the writings of Bacon. In this context, key concepts of German ide-
alism and the very idea of university are also important, such as the distinction
between people who are “sentenced to success” and those who are “condemned to
failure.” Certainly, the Humboldt University was no longer a “recipe for success,”
because the social energy had already moved their centers of gravity elsewhere. 
Certainly the idea of power is not explored in its entirety within this issue.
Rather, within these pages only certain aspects are pointed out and discussed.
However, these elements of power may serve as a starting point for further multi-
threaded interpretations of this complex construct. Such discussions, including
those within the traditions of Problemgeschichte and Begriffsgeschichte, need not
necessarily be based on the inventory of one language, but can be explored through
the lens’ of various dominant languages of modern philosophy. Without taking
these elements into consideration, we can share in Caillois’ conclusion that:
All power is magic, if we call magic the ability to produce effects without direct
contact or agency, causing a perfect and immediate docility of things. But
things are not docile; it is necessary to move certain forces, and for these forces
to in turn affect the points of application. Also casting sorcerer remains harm-
less, if it does not add any safer maneuver. But men are more obedient than
things: much can affect them by way of words or signs. There is no more a
common experience. Magic is the idea that we can control things as if they
were beings. Such is the image of all power.82
One can add that the word “force” can designate a “mechanical power over things,”
and also, metaphorically, “a power of will.” Power as authority, in a democratic
state, and it must be exercised not by force, but by the “goal strength.” The resort
to pure force characterizes authoritarian regimes or exceptional situations endan-
gering the common good of the nation or state. As suggested by Noam Chomsky,
it it also worth recalling the definition of power from the point of view of eco-
See: P. Bourdieu, Homo academicus, trans. by P. Collier, Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press 1988.
[Transl. by M. H. Kowalewicz], see: R. Caillois: Le pouvoir charismatique, p. 315: “Tout pouvoir
est une magie réelle, si l’on appelle magie la possibilité de produire des effets sans contact ni agent,
en provoquant pour ainsi dire une parfaite et immédiate docilité des choses. Or les choses ne sont
pas dociles, il faut des forces pour les mouvoir et, pour ces forces, des points d’application. Aussi
l’incantation du sorcier demeure-t-elle inoffensive, s’il n’y ajoute pas quelque manœuvre plus sure.
Mais les homes sont plus obéissants que les choses: on peut beaucoup obtenir d’eux par des paroles
ou par des signes. Il n’est pas d’expérience plus courante. La magie, c’est l’idée qu’on peut commander




nomics, particularly that which was proposed in the late 1960s by John K. Gal-
braith: “Power in economic life has over time passed from its ancient association
with capital and then on, in recent times, to the composite of knowledge and skills
which comprises the technostructure … [that is, the group that] embraces all who
bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making [in
government and corporation].”83
Certainly the tendency to invent simple, but radical conceptual oppositions in
the second half of the 20th century contributed to the development of an academic
tendency to generate mirror reflections and interdependencies between different
concepts at the beginning of the new millennium. Michel Foucault’s oppositions,
such as that between truth and power, power and knowledge, and truth and ide-
ology, exemplify this trend and led to a various declinations in dialectical schemes.
This is what happened, inter alia, in the case of the concepts of the idea of power
and the power of ideas. And although it fits fully within this newly-fashionable
trend, the editors of Orbis idearum decided to devote a special issue to the topic
of the “power of ideas,” the importance of which was spoken about by the likes of
Isaah Berlin84 and Heinrich Heine in his De l’Allemagne (written while in exile in
France).85
We get to know the importance of religion as power not only from the perspec-
tive of Heine, but also from within the experiences of our everyday life.86 With
the idea of power in mind, we can draw attention to the reflections about charis-
matic power by Caillois, where in a dramatic way he presents the essence of the
concept of power:
Sometimes we imagine that there are despots who keep their peoples in com-
pliance with machine guns and force everyone to perform particular tasks under
the threat of the gun. This is ultimately a simplification of the mind. In fact,
the machine guns never play a big role. They rarely have the opportunity to go
into action. Moreover, it is doubtful that they could compel the masses to work.
They can only kill many people. Also, it is not so much the machine guns that
count, but rather the idea of the machine guns. And even more the idea that
they are in the service of the government. I ask nothing more: I only want to
suggest that in all power relations, the idea is more important than strength.
Without that, moreover, the power would belong to men who manipulate the
machine guns, not to the officers who command them [...].87
Quoted from: N. Chomsky: Knowledge and Power: Intellectuals and the Welfare-Warfare State. In:
Masters of Mankind, London: Hamish Hamilton 2015, p. 20 [see also in original: J. K. Galbraith:
The New Industriel State, New York: Houghton Milfflin 1967].
See: I. Berlin: The Proper Study of Mankind. An Anthology of Essays, London: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
1997, p. 192.
See: H. Heine: De l’Allemagne, 2 vol., Paris: Lévy frères 1855.
See: id.: Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland, Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam 1997.







This is perhaps the reason why our children like to play with machine guns – not
only boys, but also girls. This can be seen in computer games, where you can vir-
tually seen the effects of potestas, potentia, Macht, Gewalt, strength, and violence
– all these languages of power. Like never before the virtual and real meet in the
form of violence and destruction. This experience has been captured by a single
concept, which in light of the conceptual shifts in the last three centuries has never
before carried within it such clear signs of rebellious force as today.
In his study Envisioning Power, published in 1999, Eric R. Wolf observed that
“culture is a concept sinking fast, and power is a concept rising fast.”88 Two years
before, Enrique Krause, one of the leading historians of ideas in Latin America,89
wrote the history of recent two centuries of Mexico with the characteristic title:
Biography of Power. Today is it possible to rewrite a new global “biography of
power” and not to limit it only to Mexico, as did Enrique Krauze. Perhaps it will
change only the language we use to describe power. Perhaps it will develop in the
way prophesied at the beginning of the millennium by Juan Enriquez on the pages
of the Harvard Review on Latin America: “Two centuries ago intellectuals read
Latin and Greek, a century ago French and/or German. Then English was almost
sine qua non. Intellectuals must be among the first to understand, debate, create,
and transmit a new dominant language. Today the dominant language is Mi-
crosoft. Tomorrow’s will be genetics.”90 Just as today we can write a biography of
power in terms of genetics, tomorrow we surrender the politics of new bio-pow-
ers.
at the end of 2015, 
a time of global social turbulence on European soil 
parfois qu’il existe des despotes qui maintiennent leurs peuples en respect avec des mitrailleuses et
qui forcent chacun à s’acquitter de sa tâche particulière sous la menace du fusil. Ce n’est finalement
qu’une commodité, qu’une simplification de l’esprit. En fait, les mitrailleuses ne jouent jamais si
grand rôle. Elles ont rarement l’occasion d’entrer en action. En outre, il est douteux qu’elles puissent
obliger une multitude au travail. Elles peuvent seulement tuer beaucoup de monde. Aussi, ce ne sont
pas tellement les mitrailleuses qui comptent, c’est plutôt l’idée des mitrailleuses. Et encore plus l’idée
qu’elles sont au service du gouvernement. Je ne demande rien de plus: je veux seulement donner à
penser qu’en toute relations de pouvoir, l’idée compte plus que la force. Sans cela, d’ailleurs, le pouvoir
appartiendrait aux hommes qui manœuvrent les mitrailleuses, non aux officiers qui les commandent
[...].”
See: E. R. Wolf: Envisioning Power: Ideologies of Dominance and Crisis, Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press 1999; see also: id. / S. Silverman: Pathways of Power: Building an Anthropology of the
Modern World, Berkeley: University of California Press 2001.
See: E. Krauze: Mexico: Biography of Power. A History of Modern Mexico, 1810–1996, transl. by H.
Heifetz, New York, NY: HarperCollins 1997.
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The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesisticall and Civill, London: Printed for Andrew
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